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Cook: Should Right of Publicity Protection be Extended to Actors in the

SHOULD RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTION
BE EXTENDED TO ACTORS IN THE
CHARACTERS WHICH THEY PORTRAY

INTRODUCTION

"Hello... Newman."
"Get OUT!"
"It's Shrinkage!"
"Giddy Up!"
Millions of Americans who faithfully watched the television
show Seinfeld identify these "catch phrases" with the characters
that spoke them episode after episode on the most watched sitcom
on television.' Pursuant to the Federal Copyright Statute, these
characters are protected by the Seinfeld copyright, as they appear in
the "original work[s] of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression."2 Additionally, certain distinct characters may receive
copyright protection when they are removed from their original
works and then placed in an unrelated work.3 In such cases, courts
1 Tom Gliatto, Much Ado About Nothing, PEOPLE, Jan. 12, 1998, 119, 120.
Roughly 32 million people tuned in to Seinfeld each week. For the benefit of
those who strayed from the "Must See TV" line-up, these "catch phrases" were
spoken weekly by Jerry Seinfeld (playing the self-entitled star); Julia LouisDreyfus (Elaine Benes); Jason Alexander (George Costanza); and Michael
Richards (Cosmo Kramer), respectively.
2 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
3 When determining the copyrightability of motion picture characters, courts
have applied both the "story being told" and "character delineation" tests. See
Dean D. Niro, Protecting Charactersthrough Copyright Law: Paving a New
Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion Picture Characters Can All
Travel, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 359 (1992). Courts agree on* one issue when
determining the copyrightability of a character: "To be protected by copyright
apart from the story in which it originally appeared, a character must be more
than an idea in the public domain." Niro, at 360. See also Anderson v. Stallone,
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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have provided copyright owners with protection from infringement
of the characters' physical likenesses, 4 speaking mannerisms, 5
personalities, methods of interacting with others6 and physical
surroundings.'
For example, Castle Rock Entertainment, the owner of the
Seinfeld copyright,8 may seek redress against anyone who, without
authorization, displays the Seinfeld character, Kramer, as he
appears in the original work of authorship, on a tee shirt.
However, copyright law does not provide the actor Michael
Richards, who plays the part of Kramer, the means by which to
seek redress for the unauthorized use of his character on the same
tee shirt. Thus, the question arises: Since actors do not receive
copyright protection of the characters which they play, should
these characters be protected by the right of publicity?
The right of publicity "signif[ies] the right of an individual,
especially a public figure or a celebrity, to control the commercial
value and exploitation of his [or her] name and picture or likeness
and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for
commercial benefit." ' The doctrine is based on the recognition that
"a famous individual's name, likeness, and endorsement carry
value and an unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting
the value of the name and depriving that individual of
compensation."'" The theory for extending the right of publicity to
11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (The court applied both the
character delineation and the story being told tests when providing copyright
protection for the characters from the motion picture, Rocky.); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977)
(The Ninth Circuit applied the character delineation test, with emphasis on the
character's "total concept and feel" in its decision to provide copyright
protection for the character, H.R. Pufnstuf).
4 See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
679 (C.D. Cal. 1982)(E.T.).
5 Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
6 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1166-1169.
71d.
8 The Library of Congress Catalogs (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
http://lcweb.loc.gov/cgi-bin/zgate.
9 Estate ofPresley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
10 McFarlandv. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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provide redress for misappropriations of an actor's character stems
from the belief that in certain situations, an actor may develop the
character in a way so distinctive as to elicit recognition of the actor
from use of the character alone.1 As the purpose of the right of
publicity is to prevent exploitation of an individual," it should then
follow that the doctrine should protect against any commercial
misappropriation, such as use of an actor's character, that exploits
an individual.
Although the right of publicity is a well-recognized doctrine and
about half of the states have right of publicity statutes, some
academics and practitioners are opposed to the doctrine. Scholars
adverse to the right of publicity argue that actors do not create their
characters, rather, characters are developed by studios, producers,
writers, and the audiences who perceive them. 3 However,
"[r]egardless of the input from others, celebrities still remain the
vehicles through which their images are conveyed to the public." 4
After all, using the above hypothetical, the recognition of a
"Kramer" tee shirt is elicited by the public's association of the
character with Michael Richard's face." Although the script is
written, the timing is rehearsed, and the movements are directed,
the actor's interpretation and presentation of these elements form
the fictional character into an actual person in the public's mind.
Accordingly, Seinfeld's writers' formulation of the script does not,
in and of itself, create the aforementioned "catch phrases." The
actor's delivery, personality and energy are just a few factors that
11 See id. at 920. The court held that "originality plays a role" when
deciding whether the character is associated with the actor who portrayed the
part. Id.
12 Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1353.
13 See, e.g., Rosemary J.Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity
Rights Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 365, 368 (1992); Michael Madow, PrivateOwnership of Public Image:
PopularCulture and PublicityRights, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 127, 182-196 (1993).
14 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame,73 Ind. L.J. 1, 42 (1997).
15 See Kwall, supra note 14, at 41-43. Professor Kwall notes that use of a
celebrity's likeness to appropriate a fictional character that he or she played
supports the position that "the character is as much the creation of the individual
playing the character as the author of the script and the show's producer."
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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contribute to the construction of the character identified by these
phrases.
Nonetheless, not every character is so closely associated with the
actor who plays the role that the character elicits recognition of the
actor who plays the part. Thus, this Case Note proposes that a
celebrity's right of publicity should extend beyond the celebrity's
personal image and encompass characters that have become so
associated with the actor as to elicit recognition of the celebrity
solely through appropriation of the character. 6 An individual may
also seek redress for unauthorized commercial uses of his or her
persona under other theories of law, such as §43 of the Lanham
Act,1 7 state unfair competition claims,18 and state misappropriation
claims; however, these causes of action will not be discussed
here.

19

A few recent decisions have provided redress for actors upon
appropriation of their closely associated character, without holding
that such protection was conferred by the actor's right of
publicity. 0 This Case Note takes the position that the policies and
goals underlying the right of publicity not only allow, but
necessitate the protection of any misappropriation of an
16 McFarland, 14 F.3d 912. The Third Circuit is currently the only
jurisdiction to adopt this test.
17 This section of the Lanham Act prohibits the use of any word, term, name,
symbol or device that is a "false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person." 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A).
18 State unfair competition laws are designed to protect less distinctive
subject matter. Unfair competition is defined as "include[ing] any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising..." California Business and Professions Code Section
17200.
19 Misappropriation is a state based tort claim. See Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's
imitation of Bette Midler's voice was an actionable misappropriation claim).
20 See infra notes 26 through 31, 35 through 46, 49 through 52, 59 through
64, 72 through 80, 103 through 110 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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individual's identity. Moreover, this Case Note opines that courts
must uniformly recognize a celebrity's right of publicity, not just
in his or her personal image, but also in the image of a character
that is closely associated with the actor.
Thus, this Case Note consists of three parts. Part I will provide
an overview of decisions that have provided an actor with
protection from appropriation of a character closely associated with
the performer. Only one court has explicitly held the right of
publicity protects an actor from unauthorized uses of his or her
character when the actor has become so "closely associated" or
"inextricably linked" to a character, that exploitation of the
character appropriated the actor's identity.2
Therefore, the
overview will center on decisions which have considered the issue
of character misappropriation in the context of a violation of the
actor's personal right of publicity. Moreover, the overview will be
structured as a "spectrum of protection," beginning with situations
where the actor is incorporated into the creation of the character,
which are presumed protectible, and continuing to instances in
which the character is independently created, thus requiring
evidence of the public's association of the character with the actor
in order to necessitate protection.
Part II will analyze the inadequacies in the application of the
current law, noting the three areas where courts seem the most
inconsistent: (1) what characters are eligible to receive right of
publicity protection; (2) what aspects or traits of the characters are
protected by the right of publicity; and (3) how much of the
character must be appropriated to warrant a right of publicity cause
of action.
Part II will propose an alternative analysis that provides for
protection of characters under the doctrine of the right of publicity.
This section will acknowledge that in order to truly serve the
objectives of the right of publicity, a federal statute must be
implemented to provide notice to would-be infringers and
eliminate a defendant's ability to "forum shop" for a state with
more lenient laws in the area of personal rights. The proposed test
will determine which characters may receive right of publicity
21 McFarland,14 F.3d 912.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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protection by using a sliding scale approach, which compares the
degree the actor is incorporated in the development of the character
with the degree of public association of the actor with the
character. In addition, this test will propose that characters should
be afforded the same protection that the right of publicity provides
for misappropriation of celebrity personas. Finally, a case by case
analysis should be implemented to determine the extent to which a
defendant must appropriate the character's identity in order to
warrant a valid right of publicity claim.
PART I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY'S
APPLICATION TO CHARACTERS
Many court decisions have granted an actor protection from
exploitation of his or her character without explicitly holding that
the right of publicity may extend to the protection of characters.22
Courts appear reluctant to grant a celebrity a property interest in a
character, to which the actor retains no legal rights.23 Therefore,
this overview is not structured to set forth cases where acceptance
of this view has been advanced, but will analyze the case law as it
provides a spectrum for protection of characters, beginning when a
character's protection is the most compelling, as the actor is
incorporated in the development of the character, and continuing to
instances which require a case by case analysis of the public's view
of the character, as the character is distinct from the actor playing
the part.
This spectrum is comprised of the following "tiers" of
protection: (1) the actor portrays himself or herself as a character;
(2) the actor creates the character; (3) the character is based on the
22 See infra notes 26 through 31, 35 through 46, 49 through 52, 59 through
64, 72 through 80, 103 through 110 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911 (1996); Baltimore
Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). Both
courts have held right of publicity actions cannot be brought against
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, as actors do not own any rights in the
works, thus causing preemption by the Federal Copyright Act. See also Wendt,
125 F.3d at 811, where the court held that the actors could not retain any rights
in their characters, as Paramount held the copyright of the creative elements of
the characters. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431-435
(1979).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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actor; (4) the actor plays a character with the same name, but with
fictional elements; (5) the actor plays a character with the same
first name, but with fictional elements; and (6) the actor plays a
character who is dissimilar to himself or herself, but has become
associated with the character. It should be noted that these tiers
provide an outline of the levels by which a character is inherently
protected; however, these categories are illustrative rather than
exhaustive, as new ideas for characterizations emerge. Moreover,
the spectrum should be viewed as a continuum, with the tiers
overlapping and the examples fitting into two and sometimes three
classifications.
A. The Actor Plays Himself or Herselfas a Character
For almost fifty years,24 celebrities have enjoyed protection of
their "pecuniary interest[s] in the commercial exploitation of [their]
identit[ies]" under the right of publicity." When an actor plays
himself or herself as a character, the character shares the actor's
identity. Therefore, these situations present the strongest argument
for right of publicity's extension to cases of character
misappropriation.
The clearest example of an actor playing himself or herself in a
role is that of a game show host or talk show host. In these
situations, the character has the same name as the actor and the
actor is not bound to a writer's script. The character has the same
personality, mannerisms, speech patterns and style as the actor.
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Carson v. Here'sJohnny Portable
Toilets26 supports the contention that such characters should
receive right of publicity protection. In this case, the appellee,
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, used the slogan "Here's Johnny"
coupled with the phrase, "The World's Foremost Commodian" to
identify and advertise their portable toilets.27 The court held that
the phrase violated Johnny Carson's right of publicity, despite the
24 Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The right of publicity was officially
recognized in this 1953 decision.
25 Madow, supra note 13, at FN 14.
26 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
27 Id. at 833.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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fact that the appellee did not use Carson's name or likeness.28 The
court explained the right of publicity protects an actor's pecuniary
interest in his identity; therefore, any phrase or image identifying
the actor is an invasion of this right.2 9 Although the court held the
phrase "Here's Johnny" sufficiently identified Carson," the phrase
did not identify Johnny Carson the individual, but rather, Johnny
Carson as the host of The Tonight Show.31 Therefore, this decision
supports the view that a celebrity, such as a game show host, who
plays himself as a character has a right of publicity in the character,
as the defendant in the case appropriated Carson's character rather
than Carson as an individual.
Thus, the Carson holding provides a basis for which celebrities
such as David Letterman, Conan O'Brien, Oprah Winfrey, and yes,
even Jerry Springer, may retain a proprietary interest in their onscreen talk show characters.
Although these celebrities'
monologues and interviews are undoubtedly written by someone
other than themselves, the impromptu and unpredictable style of
these shows permit the celebrity to incorporate himself or herself
into the character. Similarly, an actor can also create a character
when he or she has no script, but creates the character apart from
himself or herself. These situations will be discussed in the next
tier of the spectrum.
B. The Actor Creates the Character
In 1979, Justice Mosk explained in his concurrence to Lugosi
32
v. UniversalPictures:
I do not suggest that an actor can never retain a
proprietary interest in a characterization. An original
creation of a fictional figure played exclusively by its
creator may well be protectible.33 Thus Groucho Marx just
being Groucho Marx, with his mustache, cigar, slouch and
28 Id. at 835.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 836. The court acknowledged that "the phrase 'Here's Johnny' had
been used for years to introduce Carson" on the Tonight Show.
32 603 P.2d 425.
33 Goldstein v. California,412 U.S. 546 (1973).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4

8

Cook: Should Right of Publicity Protection be Extended to Actors in the

1999]

RIGHT OFPUBLICITY PROTECTION
leer, cannot be exploited by others. Red Skelton's variety
of self-devised roles would appear to be protectible, as
would the unique personal creations of Abbott and
Costello, Laurel and Hardy and others of that genre.34

Justice Mosk's concurrence both explains and provides examples
for the second level of the spectrum: situations where the actor
creates his or her character. This tier resembles the previous
section in that the actor is not confined to a script; however, here
the actor portrays a fictional character rather than acting as himself
or herself.
In Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc.," the descendants of
Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy brought suit for violation of the
actors' rights of publicity. Worldvision Enterprises, the copyright
holder of certain Laurel and Hardy pictures, impersonated the
Laurel and Hardy characters in a pilot and proposed television
series, "Stan n' Ollie."36 The court held the defendant's use of the
34 603 P.2d at 431 (Mosk, J., concurring). In Lugosi, the appellants, Bela
Lugosi's descendants, sought to recover profits made by Universal Pictures'
commercial licensing of the Count Dracula character. Id. at 426. The items that
were merchandised were made in the likeness and appearance of Bela Lugosi in
his role of Count Dracula, even though other actors such as Christopher Lee,
Don Chaney and John Carradine had also played Count Dracula. Id. at 427.
The court based its decision on the issue of whether the right to exploit one's
image is a personal right that can only be exercised during one's lifetime. See
id. at 429-430. The court held that such a right is personal; however, concurring
Justice Mosk and dissenting Chief Justice Bird seemed to conflict on the issue of
whether an actor could hold a right of publicity in a character. See id. at 431454. Justice Mosk opined that an actor may only possess a proprietary interest
in an "original creation" played by its "creator," Id. at 431 (Mosk, J.,
concurring), as opposed to Chief Justice Bird's assertion that the right of
publicity should extend to appropriations of the actor's likeness in his or her
portrayal of a fictional character because the portrayals of the characters "may
well be considerably more important than protection for the individual's
'natural' appearance." Id. at 445 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
35 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
36 Price, 455 F. Supp. at 257. The defendants advertised the series with the
following printed flyer: "Chuck McCann plays the explosive Ollie opposite Jim
Mac George's portrayal of the lovable, bumbling Stan. They get involved in all
types of side-splitting situations which seem to end in total chaos with Ollie's
indignant disclaimer' ... a fine mess you've gotten us into! "' Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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characters violated a previously issued injunction which prohibited
the defendants from impersonating Laurel and Hardy's "physical
likeness or appearances, costumes and mannerisms, and/or the
simulation of their voices, for advertising or commercial purposes,
including their use in or in connection with ...the production of
animated cartoons or motion pictures . . .""3 The court then
explained that right of publicity protection is more frequently
extended to characters in instances, such as the one at hand, where
the actors create the fictional characters, rather than a
screenwriter.38 Moreover, this decision resulted in the actors'
rights of publicity, where were bequeathed to the plaintiffs,
trumping the defendants' copyright ownership in the motion
pictures, in that such ownership did not "entitle [the copyright
owners] to exclusive use of the names and likeness of Laurel and
Hardy for all commercial purposes. 3 9
The same court gave credence to Justice Mosk's expansive
views on the right of publicity in its subsequent decision of
Goucho Marx Prods.v. Day and Night Co., Inc., ° holding the right
of publicity extends to the "unique characters" which Groucho,
Harpo and Chico Marx created.4 In Groucho Marx, the plaintiff,
the assignee of all "rights, title and interest in the name, likeness
and style of the character Groucho, both as an individual and as a
member of the Marx Brothers,"42 brought suit against the
defendants for their production of a Broadway play where the
actors in the second half simulated the "unique appearance, style
and mannerisms of the Marx Brothers."43 The court recognized
that "the Marx Brothers' fame arose as a direct result of their
37 Id. at 257-258.
38 Price v. HalRoach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39 Price,400 F. Supp. at 842-843. Justice Stewart issued the injunctive order
against Hal Roach Studios in this 1975 opinion. In a later opinion, Justice
Haight affirmed the injunctive order against Worldvision Enters, Inc., as the
case involved "the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies...
involved in both suits." Price,455 F. Supp. at 256.
40 523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d
317 (2d Cir. 1982).
41 Id. at 492.
42 Id.at 486.
43 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4

10

Cook: Should Right of Publicity Protection be Extended to Actors in the

1999]

RIGHT OFPUBLICITY PROTECTION

319

efforts to develop instantly recognizable and popular stage
characters, having no relation to their real personalities."'
The
court held that the defendants' impersonation of these characters
violated the plaintiffs' right of publicity,45 as the "Marx Brothers
exploited their rights of publicity in their self-created characters."46
Additionally, an actor may create multiple characters which are
recognized for one distinctive combination of style, appearance
and mannerisms, such as Woody Allen's characterizations he has
developed and portrayed throughout his career. Woody Allen, a
well known movie star and director, is renowned for his common
portrayal of a neurotic, nervous and worrisome character in most of
his earlier roles.47 Although the personalities of the characters are
the same, the characters themselves differ from film to film. While
the characters are not usually named after the actor himself,
Woody Allen's development of these common characteristics in
his roles sets his characters apart as distinctly his own. The public
can only speculate as to whether these character traits are a
fictitious creation by the actor, or in fact the essence of the actor's
personality.48
This precise issue was addressed in Allen v. National Video,
Inc.49 where the defendant ran an advertisement featuring a
celebrity look-alike whose hair style and expression resembled the
44 Id. at 491.
45 Id. at 492.
46 Id.
47 Allen's characters in his earlier films frequently portray elements of his
"obsessive love of New York, his dislike of California (mostly L.A.) fads and
intellectual pomposity, his introspective neuroses and pessimism, his requisite
jokes and psychosexual angst about sex, put-downs of his own appearance and
personality, the subjects of anti-Semitism, life, drugs and death, and distorted
memories of his childhood." Time Dirks, Review of Annie Hall (1977), (visited
Nov. 19, 1998) http://www.filmsite.org/anni.htm.
48 "Annie Hall clearly has autobiographical elements - it is the freewheeling, stream-of-consciousness story of an inept, angst-ridden comedian
much like Allen himself who experienced crises related to his relationship and
family. [A real-life relationship and breakup did occur between Allen and costar Keaton. Keaton's birth name was Diane Hall and her nickname was Annie.
And Woody Allen played a similar role as mentor to Diane Keaton.]" Dirks,
supra note 47.
49 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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"schlemiel" character which was embodied by Woody Allen in
"Annie Hall" and similar films.50 The court recognized the
advertisement exploited the persona created by Allen in his earlier
works;" however, in finding in favor of the plaintiff, the court did
not decide whether Allen's right of publicity was violated, but
rather deferred the issue to a determination under the Lanham Act,
under which the court held that a likelihood of consumer confusion
existed as a matter of law. 2 Nonetheless, the court's recognition
that a celebrity may be exploited by his character supports the view
that right of publicity protection should be extended to characters
that identify the actors who create and portray them.
Consequently, an actor can create a unique fictional character,
and in some instances can create a unique character trait common
throughout multiple characters, that will identify the actor if
exploited. These decisions exemplify certain courts' willingness to
provide right of publicity protection to characters when the actor
who plays the role also created it. 3 As this overview moves away
from the more obvious situations where a character may receive
right of publicity protection, the next tier discusses instances where
the character is created by the writer or producer, rather than by the
actor himself or herself, but the character is based on the actor.
C. The Characteris Based on the Actor
When casting a well-known celebrity, a producer or director may
develop a role which is based on the actor's identity, yet invent a
character separate from the celebrity.
In these situations,
sometimes referred to as cameo appearances, an actor plays a
character that is based on his or her real-life persona, sometimes
50 Id. at 617. The advertisement is described as portraying "a customer in a
National Video store, an individual in his forties, with a high forehead, tousled
hair, and heavy black glasses. The customer's elbow is on the counter, and his
face, bearing an expression at once quizzical and somewhat smug, is leaning on
his hand. It is not disputed that, in general, the physical features and pose are
characteristic of plaintiff." Id. at 617-618.
51 Id. at 624.
52 Id. at 629-630.
53 This view is common to scholars' criticism of the right of publicity. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4

12

Cook: Should Right of Publicity Protection be Extended to Actors in the

1999]

RIGHT OFPUBLICITY PROTECTION

even playing a character with the same name; however, in the
portrayal of the role, the actor does not have the freedom to
actually "play" himself or herself, because he or she is confined to4
a script. For instance, in the movie Ace Ventura: Pet Detective,1
Dan Marino played a character who was the quarterback for the
Miami Dolphins named "Dan Marino". Obviously, it is no
coincidence that Marino actually is the Miami Dolphin's
quarterback; however, Dan Marino, while playing this character
based on himself, did not "play himself' in Ace Ventura, because
the character was developed in relation to the plot of the movie."5
Other examples of this type of "celebrity as a celebrity" casting
could be seen on episodes of the television show Murphy Brown,
where news broadcasters frequently appeared on the sit-coin as
"themselves," although their portrayals were restricted to the
show's script.56 Moreover, Woody Allen's latest film, Celebriy 7
features Leonardo DiCaprio, one of today's most popular
celebrities, in a role that is quasi-based on the actor, as it explores
some of the dynamics of the celebrity life. 8 Though DiCaprio's
real-life experiences are undoubtedly similar to those of his
character in the film, the character is a creation separate from the
actor himself.

54 Ace Ventura: Pet Detective was directed by Tom Shadyac and written by
Jack Bernstein, Tom Shadyac and Jim Carrey. The cast includes Jim Carrey,
Sean Young, Courtney Cox, Tone Loc, and Dan Marino. Great Comedies
(visited Nov. 18, 1998) http://www.homevideos.com/revcom/l.htm.
55 In the movie, "Ace ... is hired to solve the kidnapping of the Miami
Dolphins' mascot, Snowflake, which is followed by the disappearance of
quarterback Dan Marino." Rita Kempley, "Ace Ventura: Pet Detective" (PG13) (last modified Feb. 4, 1994) http://www.washintonpost.com/wp-s.

56 Murphy Brown hosted cameo appearances by celebrities such as Leeza
Gibbons, John Tesh and Kathleen Sullivan (Episode 49: "Going to the
Chapel"); Larry King (Episode 57: "Rootless People"); Katie Couric, Joan
Lunden and Paula Zahn (Episode 100: "A Chance of Showers"). Guide to
Murphy Brown (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.xnet.com>.

57 (Miramax 1998).
58 DiCaprio portrays an out-of-control movie star who is followed by a
writer/journalist who is assigned to the celebrity beat. Celebrity(visited Oct. 22,

1998) http://www.miramax.com:8888/ows-doc/celebrity.
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Right of publicity cases have also arisen in these types of casting
situations. In Rogers v. Girmaldi and MM/UA Ent. Co.,59 the
Southern District of New York addressed the issue of whether
Ginger Rogers' right of publicity was violated by the defendants'
distribution and production of a film in which the characters were
dancers who imitated Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, and
consequently were nicknamed "Fred and Ginger."6
Rogers
claimed that the film, "Frederico Fellini's 'Ginger and Fred'
misappropriated her public personality which she developed in her
performances in some seventy-three motion picture films, the most
renowned of which being her portrayal of a ballroom dancer with
her co-star, Fred Astaire. 6 Rogers presented survey evidence
reporting that a number of people exposed to the film's title and
the film's advertisement connected the film with Rogers. 2 Rogers
also cited MGM's marketing strategies for the film, which
included a request that guests invited to the premiere dress as
"Ginger and Fred" by using a dance cane and other associated
attire, as evidence of misappropriation.63 While the court did not
reject the contention that Roger's right of publicity could be
violated through appropriation of her elegant ballroom-dancing
59 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
60 Id. at 114. The film is described as "a fictional work that depicts the
bittersweet reunion of two retired dancers. Decades earlier, as the Film's story
goes, these two dancers had made a living in Italian cabarets imitating Fred
Astaire and Ginger Rogers, thus earning the nickname "Ginger and Fred." The
Film satirizes the world of television by presenting the central characters'
reunion against the background of an Italian television special for which they
are called upon to reprise the routine that they have not performed in 30 years."
Id.
61 Id. at 113-115. Fred and Ginger co-starred in ten musical films,
"beginning with "Flying Down to Rio" in 1933 and concluding with "The
Barkleys of Broadway" in 1949, established Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers as
the icons of elegant ballroom dancing during Hollywood's Golden Age." Id.at
113.
62 Id. at 115. "Rogers ... submitted a market research survey dated July
1986 reporting that based on approximately 200 interviews in Boston and New
York (Staten Island) 43% of those exposed to the Film's title only connected the
Film with Rogers and that 27% of those exposed to the Film's advertisement
connected the Film with Rogers." Id.
63 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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character, the court held the film did not use Rogers' name for a
commercial purpose and consequently dismissed her right of
publicity claim. '
Despite the court's judgment for the defendant, its opinion did
not undermine the viability of an actor's right of publicity claim
against a defendant who commercially exploits a character based
on the actor. Although Ginger Rogers did not make cameo
appearances per se in her countless ballroom dancing films,6" she
did appear in her capacity as a dancer named Ginger Rogers; thus
creating a situation analogous to the aforementioned "celebrity as
celebrity" castings. Consequently, the Rogers opinion presents a
case for which such characters should be eligible for right of
publicity protection.
The next tier of the spectrum addresses situations where an actor
plays a character who has the same name as the actor, but
possesses fictional elements.
D. The Actor Plays a Characterwith the Same Name, but with
FictionalElements
This category is closely related to the preceding section;
however, differs in that the character, although bearing the same
name as the actor, is not developed in relation to the actor's
persona, but rather, is based on fictional elements. Television sitcoms such as Seinfeld and The Cosby Show utilize this type of
casting and character development.66
Seinfeld derived both the title of the series and the name of its
central character from the actor who portrayed him. While the
character of Jerry Seinfeld was based on the actor, as both are
64 Id. at 124.
65 Id. at 113. "This famous pair became so well known that the term 'Fred
and Ginger' has come to be a metaphorical symbol for fine ballroom dancers
and is frequently used in the press as a shorthand term for elegant dancers and
dancing." Id.
66 It should be noted that the classification of the television show, Seinfeld, is
difficult to determine, as it contains elements of both the aforementioned
category and the current category. Thus, the reader should keep in mind that, as
explained earlier, the tiers of the spectrum should not be viewed as distinct, but
rather as a continuum in which some works may fall somewhere between the
explanations of each tier.
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single, stand-up comedians who perform much of their comic acts
in New York, Jerry Seinfeld the character was based on fictional
elements outside of the scope of Jerry Seinfeld the individual.67
Although the previous category also encompasses characterizations
that, though based on the actor contain fictional elements, the
character of Jerry Seinfeld differs in that it was not based entirely
on the actor's public image as a stand-up comedian. Rather, the
show focused on the daily activities on the character Jerry instead
of his stand-up routines, thus deriving the series' classification as
"a show about nothing., 68
The casting of The Cosby Show,69 which was also named after
the actor who played the main character, differs from Seinfeld in
that Bill Cosby did not play a character named after himself, but
instead portrayed the character of Heathcliff Huxtable.7"
Nonetheless, the series was named after the actor and thereby
associated with Bill Cosby. Moreover, the main character was
based on Bill Cosby to an extent, as he portrayed a father and a
"funny-man."'5

67 "Stand-up comedian Jerry Seinfeld stars in this innovative, half-hour
series, which blends situation "Seinfeld" comedy with his own stand-up
routines."
Seinfeld
(visited
Nov.
23,
1998)
http://www.spe.song.com/tv/shows/seinfeld.
68 Perhaps another explanation for the placement of Jerry's character within
this category is that this character was developed throughout the nine year life of
the series, thus taking on an identity of his own, unlike the characterizations in
the previous category which were guest-appearances or one-time portrayals.
69 (NBC television broadcast, 9/20/84 to 9/17/92).
70 "The series was one of the few to portray African-Americans as upperclass. It was more reminiscent of the old style comedies such as Ozzie and
Harrietthan it was Sanford and Son. Cosby had total creative control of the
series and it often spotlighted his views on childrearing." F. Colin Kingston, TV
Dads, Past
and Present (last
modified
June
9,
1998)
http://www.suitel0l.com/article.cfi/television/8088.
71 The show was based, at least in part, on Cosby's own experiences as a
father of multiple children, as evidenced in the show's script, which at times
borrowed from Cosby's stand-up routines detailing his life as a father. F. Colin
Kingston, TV Dads, Past and Present (last modified June 9, 1998)
http://www.suitel0l.com/article.cfin/television/8088.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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One case which addressed a similar type of casting is the Ninth
Circuit's decision of White v. Samsung Electronics, Inc.7 2 In
White, the defendant, Samsung, developed a series of
advertisements depicting a Samsung product along with other
items and a humorous prediction of their existence in the twentyfirst century.7 3 "The ads were meant to convey-humorouslythat Samsung products would still be in use twenty years from
now." 74 The advertisement that spawned litigation depicted a
robot, dressed in a wig, gown and jewelry which resembled Vanna
White's hair and dress.' The robot was positioned in front of a
Wheel-of-Fortune like game board, with its arms outreached as if
displaying the board. 76 The advertisement was captioned:
"Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D. 77
The Ninth Circuit held this depiction violated Vanna
White's right of publicity.7 The court premised its decision on a
determination of whether the defendant used White's "likeness,"
and held that even though the robot itself did not resemble White,
its blond wig, elegant dress and, most importantly, its position in
front of a game-show board elicited recognition of White's
identity.79 The court relied on Professor Prosser's explanation of
the right of publicity, where he noted, "'[it is not impossible that
there might be appropriation of the plaintiffs identity, as by
impersonation, without the use of either his [or her] name or his [or

72 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
73 Id. at 1396. "By hypothesizing outrageous future outcomes for the
cultural items, the ads created humorous effects. For example, one lampooned
current popular notions of an unhealthy diet by depicting a raw steak with the
caption: 'Revealed to be health food. 2010 A.D.' Another depicted irreverent
'news'-show host Morton Downey, Jr. in front of an American flag with the
caption 'Presidential candidate. 2008 A.D."' Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.

79 Id. at 1397-1399.
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her] likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his [or her]
right of privacy."' 8 °
Thus, the White decision supports the views advanced in this
Case Note by providing Vanna White right of publicity protection
from unauthorized uses of her character, as Samsung's
advertisement evoked the image of Vanna White as the character
who tums-or now presses-the letters on the game-show "Wheel
of Fortune." 8 Though Vanna White's character is not identical to
those portrayed by Jerry Seinfeld and Bill Cosby, the characters
played by these celebrities are all recognized by their real names,
yet their characters are fictional creations. 82 Although one may
argue that Vanna White's status as a game-show hostess is not a
character at all, her performance is also not based on herself as an
individual, as Vanna presumably only presses letters on the Wheel
of Fortune set in her capacity as a game-show hostess. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit's decision lends support to the view that fictional
characters based on the celebrity playing the role, are protected by
the celebrity's right of publicity.
Similar character development is discussed in the
proceeding tier, where a character is fictionally created, but only
adopts the actor's first name.
E. The Actor Plays a Characterwith the Same FirstName, but
with FictionalElements
This tier is closely aligned with the previous section, as the only
variable is the change of the character's last name. For instance, an
actor who frequently brings his name to his characters is Tony
Danza, whose characters acquired the actor's first name in series
80 Id. at 1397-1398, citing Prosser, Privacy,48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
81 White 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Kozinski
explained: "Samsung didn't merely parody Vanna White. It parodied Vanna
White appearing in 'Wheel of Fortune,' a copyrighted television show.. ." Id.
82 The placement of the character of Vanna White in a category is, once
again, a troublesome task, as her character does not read a script and thus, may
be comparable to talk show host characterizations. However, White's character
appears to possess less freedom in her performance, as her role as a game-show
hostess does not allow her to express her identity beyond a few closing
comments at the end of the show.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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such as Taxi, Who's the Boss, and The Tony Danza Show.8 3
Similarly, the sit-com Roseanne,84 which derived its name from the
show's central character, cast the character with the same first
name as the actress who played her. The character of Roseanne
Connor was fictional; nonetheless, the character of Roseanne,
much like the character of Jerry Seinfeld, was based at least in part
on reality, as Roseanne also lived in a lower-class neighborhood
and struggled to make ends meet before becoming a celebrity.8"
In McFarlandv. Miller,8 6 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of
whether right of publicity protection extends to an actor's character
of the same first name.8 7 George McFarland played the character
"Spanky" in the Our Gang series, appearing in ninety-five Our
Gang films from 1937 and 1942.88 Thus, McFarland became
known by the name "Spanky McFarland," in recognition of the
character he had played since the age of three.89 McFarland also
appeared in minor roles in a total of eight feature films,9" appearing
in the credits as Spanky McFarland in all but one film.9'
83 E! Online - Fact Sheet - Tony Danza (visited Nov. 23, 1998)
http://www.eonline.com/Facts/People.
84 (NBC television broadcast, 10/18/88 to 3/28/95).
85 The series, Roseanne, is a comedy which mirrors Roseanne's own blue
collar life before entering showbiz. Roseanne Episode Guide (visited 11/23/98)
http://www.tardis.ed.ac.uk/-dave/guides/Roseanne/index.html.
86 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
87 Id. at 915.
88 Id. The "Our Gang" series is described as: "The series' foundation was
pitting scruffy, mischievous have-not kids against pretentious rich kids, sissy
kids, and in general a hardened, rule-governed, class-conscious adult world that
would stand between them and the only thing that they were interested inmaking their own fun." Id. at FN 3, citing Leonard Maltin & Richard Bann, The
Little Rascals: The Life and Times of Our Gang 4 (1992).
89 Id.
90 Id. While playing the character Spanky, George McFarland appeared in
the films: "M-G-M's Day of Reckoning (1933), Paramount's Miss Fane's Baby
is Stolen (1934), RKO-Radio's Kentucky Kernels (1935) (also starring Jackie
Cooper and Wallace Beery), Paramount's early Technicolor western Trail of the
Lonesome Pine (1936), Warner Bros.' Variety Show (1937) (with Dick Powell),
and RKO's Peck's Bad Boy with the Circus (1938)... After leaving the Gang,
McFarland had a small part in Republic's Johnny Doughboy (1943) with fellow
former Gang member Carl "Alfalfa" Switzer." Id. at FN 4.
91 Id.
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McFarland brought suit for infringement of his right of publicity
against a restaurant operating under the name "Spanky
McFarland's" and using pictures of and references to the Little
Rascals and Our Gang characters in its decor and menu.92 The
Third Circuit, in holding for the plaintiff, acknowledged that an
actor may have a cause of action for infringement of his or her
right of publicity by appropriating a character in situations "where
an actor's screen persona becomes so associated with him that it
becomes inseparable from the actor's own public image." "
Additionally, the court ruled that originality also plays a role when
deciding whether a character should receive protection, citing
Justice Mosk's concurring opinion in Lugosi.94 The court
reasoned, "the actor who develop[s] the image [has] the right to
exploit it as superior to third parties which [have] nothing to do
with the actor of the character identified with the actor."95
Although George McFarland acquired the name "Spanky"
from his portrayal of the character, unlike the situations listed
above where the character derived its name from the actor, the
court's discussion focused on the fact that both the character and
the actor possessed the same name, rather than who first acquired
the name.96 Consequently, the Third Circuit is the only jurisdiction
to explicitly acknowledge that in certain situations, an actor may
receive a proprietary interest in a character. Additionally, the court
set forth the "associative value" test to determine when an actor's
right of publicity may extend to protect appropriation of his or her
character.9 Consequently, McFarlandsets forth the test whereby
characters, such as those discussed in this tier, can receive right of
92 Id. at 916.
93 Id. at 920.

94 Id. In his concurrence, Justice Mosk explained that an actor could obtain a
proprietary interest in a character in situations with "[a]n original creation of a
fictional figure played exclusively by its creator." Id., citing Lugosi, 603 P.2d at
432 (Mosk, J., concurring).

95 Id. at 921.
96 Id. at 922. "[T]he restaurant, by using the name "Spanky McFalmad's,"

appears to be commercially exploiting the image not only of the character
"Spanky" but of the actor known through most of his life as George "Spanky"

McFarland." Id.
97 Id. at 920.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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publicity protection if they are "so associated with [the actor] that
[they] become inseparable from the actor's own public image.""8
This final tier will address situations where the character is
entirely dissimilar to the actor who portrays the role; however,
pursuant to the test set forth in McFarland,the character becomes
"inextricably identified" with the actor.99
F. The Actor Plays a CharacterDissimilarto Himself or
Herself,but has Become Associated with the Character.
This tier identifies situations when a character who, though
dissimilar from the actor who portrays the character, has become
"so associated with [the actor] that [the character] becomes
inseparable from the actor's own public image, [thereby giving] the
actor... an interest in the image which gives him [or her] standing
to prevent mere interlopers from using it without authority.""
This may occur in situations where, as in McFarland,the actor has
played the same character as his or her main role for most of the
actor's life.'
Additionally, an actor may develop a proprietary
interest in his or her character when the actor brings an essence of
originality to the role. 1°'
In Wendt v. Host International,Inc., 3 the Ninth Circuit faced
the issue of whether the actors, George Wendt and John
Ratzenberger, who played the characters of "Norm and "Cliff' in
98 Id.
99 Id. The McFarlandcourt also cites Justice Mosk's concurrence in Lugosi
in its explanation, "[w]here an actor plays a well-defined party which has not
become inextricably identified with his own person, it has been suggested that
actor receives no right of exploitation in his portrayal of the character." Id.,
citing Lugos, 603 P.2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 920. This is the test set forth in McFarland.
101 Id. at 914-915. George McFarland began playing the character "Spanky"
in 1931, at the age of three, and continued to play the character through 1942.
Id. at 914. McFarland appeared in a number of films, both during and after his
portrayal of the role "Spanky;" however, his appearances were only minor roles
and at times, he was also cast with other member of the Gang. Id.
102 Id. at 920. The Third Circuit held that originality may also be a factor

when determining whether an actor's right of publicity extends to appropriations
of his or her character.
103 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the series Cheers could recover under California's statutory and
common law right of publicity." In Wendt, the defendants placed
animatronic robots resembling the Norm and Cliff characters in
airport bars that were modeled after the Cheers set."' The
defendants claimed the robots, named "Hank" and "Bob," were
neither modeled after the Cheers' characters, nor sufficiently
similar to the plaintiffs to constitute their likenesses."°6 The Ninth
Circuit ruled in favor of the actors and reversed the district court's
grant of defendant's summary judgment motion.0 7
The Wendt court held an actor has no rights to his or her
character,1"8 but may claim a violation of the right of publicity if
the misappropriation identifies the actor.1" 9 Thus the court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the robots were
"sufficiently 'like' the actors to violate California's statutory and
common law rights of publicity."0 Although the Ninth Circuit did
not expressly adopt the Third Circuit's position that a celebrity
may claim a right of publicity in his or her character upon a
104 Id. at 809.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 809-813.
107 Id. at 810-812.
108 Id. at 811. The actors did not even attempt to claim that a proprietary
interest vests in a character which the actor has become associated with, as the
court noted that the "[a]ppellants freely concede that they retain no rights to the
characters Norm and Cliff; they argue that the figures, named "Bob" and
"Hank," are not related to Paramount's copyright of the creative elements of the
characters Norm and Cliff." Id.
109d. The court further explained that while an actor cannot have a property
interest in his or her character, an actor's portrayal of a character does not
negate the ability to control exploitation of his or her own image. "While it is
true that appellants' fame arose in large part through their participation in
Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose the right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a fictional character." Id., citing
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431. The court's explanation seems circular in nature, in
that an actor typically cannot rise to celebrity status, where his or her right of
publicity becomes valuable, unless the actor plays a character which the public
recognizes. Perhaps the court's analysis acknowledged that the actors have
become "so associated" with their characters, that the public equated one with
the other, and attempted to disregard this phenomenon by explaining that its
occurrence did not affect the actors' proprietary interests in themselves.
110 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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showing of high "associative value," the court's remand order
indicated its acceptance of the view that unauthorized uses of a
character, such as the defendants' robots, may violate a celebrity's
right of publicity if the appropriation identifies the celebrity.
Although the Wendt court premised its decision upon a question
of fact of whether the appropriated images resembled the actors,
the decision effectively granted actors, bearing no similarities such
as name or personality with their characters, right of publicity
protection over exploitation of their characters.'
This tier does
not set forth examples of characters which may be eligible for such
protection, as such an analysis would require a factual
determination of whether the character is highly associated with
the actor.
Wendt's failure to acknowledge the expansion of the right of
publicity's protection to characters is common throughout the
majority of opinions discussed in this overview. This overview
has demonstrated that many courts are hesitant to provide a
celebrity with an interest in a character that he or she does not own
or has not developed." 2 However, in cases where the actor created
the character, courts appear more willing to protect the actor from
appropriation of the character."' This reasoning could stem from a
common argument of opponents to the right of publicity, many of
which opine that a character is not a creation of the actor, and
therefore, an actor cannot seek redress for uses of such." 4
Therefore, McFarlandillustrates that the actor's invention of the
character is not the sole determination of whether exploitation of a
character may appropriate the actor's identity, as McFarland did
not "create" his character by writing the script; nonetheless, he
became so associated with his role that he became known by the
111 The "Hank" and "Bob" robots were modeled after the characters "Norm"
and "Cliff' as they appeared in the Cheers series. The issue of whether the
robots' faces resembled the actors who portrayed the characters is incidental, as
it was not the actors' images which the defendants attempted to misappropriate,
but rather, the characters as they appeared when portrayed by the actors.
112 See supra notes 103 through 110 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 26 through 31, 35 through 46, 49 through 52, 59 through
64 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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character's name.11 Additionally, the "invention" requirement
loses sight of the goal underlying the right of publicity, which is to
protect individuals from commercial exploitation of their
identities.1 1 6 An individual can be exploited by avenues other than
those which he or she "created," thus, it seems logical that the
relevant inquiry should be whether the individual's identity is
commercially exploited, as every actor imports some sort of
creativity in the portrayal of the character. These issues will be
discussed in Part II of this Case Note, which analyzes the
previously cited opinions.
PART II. ANLAYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY'S
EXTENTION TO CHARACTERS
Since only one jurisdiction has expressly held an actor may
retain a proprietary interest in certain characters, the issues of (1)
which characters receive right of publicity protection; (2) what
attributes of the characters are protected; and (3) what a defendant
is required to take in order to support a right of publicity claim
have not been addressed by court decisions implicitly granting this
right. Therefore, this section will analyze each of these issues in
turn, attempting to determine the courts' intentions and reasoning
in each of these areas. The analysis will begin with the issue of
what characters receive protection.
A. What CharactersReceive Right of PublicityProtection
While it is clear that one jurisdiction provides a celebrity with
right of publicity protection," 7 and it can be inferred that other
courts favor such protection,' it is unclear to whom this protection
is afforded. The Third Circuit set forth the "associative value" test
to define the situation where an actor retains a proprietary interest
in his or her character." 9 However, while the question of whether
a character has become "so associated with [the actor] that [the
character] becomes inseparable form the actor's own public
115 McFarland,14 F.3d at 915-919.

116 See supra note 9.
117 McFarland,14 F.3d 912.
118 See supra notes 26 through 110.
119 McFarland,14 F.3d at 920.
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image' ' n may be easily decided in the situation of George
McFarland as "Spanky," the answer is not as clear when the
character is not as "legendary" as one of the "Little Rascals" and
also has not been in existence since the early 1930's.
To illustrate, consider another Seinfeld scenario involving its
cast member, Jason Alexander. Alexander played the character of
George Costanza for the entire nine-year life of the show. With an
average of 32 million viewers per week, it can be assumed a
majority of Americans associate Jason Alexander with his
character of George. Therefore, pursuant to the test set forth in
McFarland,if the public associates the character of George with
the actor who portrays him to the extent that the two are
inseparable, it seems Jason Alexander has a proprietary interest in
his Seinfeld character.
However, though Alexander may be best known for his character
of Seinfeld, he has also played in other rolls spanning from the evil
lawyer in Pretty Woman to his Tony-winning roll in Jerome
Robbins' Broadway. 21 Neither McFarland, nor other courts'
decisions are instructive as to determining whether an actor's right
of publicity may vest in one character when he or she has portrayed
other roles. For instance, in Wendt, the court essentially held that
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger held proprietary interests in
the characters they played on Cheers if, upon remand, the district
court determined that the appropriations of the characters looked
"sufficiently 'like"' the actors.'22 Although the Wendt court did not
discuss whether consideration should be given to other roles the
actors have played, it seems the existence of other roles played by
Wendt and Ratzenberger was of no significance to the court, as
both actors have played numerous other characters.12
120 Id. at 920.
121 Gliatto, supra note 1, at 124.
122 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811-812.
123 George Wendt, besides playing the character of Norm for eleven seasons
from the years of 1982 through 1993, has also appeared in the motion pictures:
Spice World (1998); The Price of Heaven (1997); Space Truckers (1997); The
Lovemaster (1996); Man of the House (1995); Shame II: The Secret (1995);
Hostage for a Day (1994); Forever Young (1992); NBA Comic Relife - The
Great Blooper Caper (1991); Never Say Die (1990); Plain Clothes (1988); Gung
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Additionally, the McFarlandcourt held the actor had a right of
publicity in his character after the actor's death.1 24 This is
significant for two reasons. First, McFarland, like Wendt and
Ratzenberger, played other characters besides the character that
was the subject of the litigation. 2 However, the court had the
benefit of hindsight to determine that throughout McFarland's
career, he was best associated with the character "Spanky.' ' 26 This
raises numerous issues. First, if litigation were to arise concerning
the hypothetical situation of Jason Alexander as the character
George Costanza, a court would not have the ability to look at
Alexander's career in its entirety to determine the public's
perception of the character with whom the actor is most associated,
as Alexander may go on to portray other, more memorable
characters in the future. Moreover, if a court were to hold that
Alexander is so associated with the character of George Costanza
that the actor's persona is implicated upon exploitation of the
character, and Alexander goes on to portray another well-known
character with whom he becomes inextricably identified, could
Alexander's right of publicity also vest in the subsequent
character? Finally, would an actor then have a proprietary interest
in more than one character, or would he or she lose the proprietary
interest in the initial character by virtue of the public's new
association with another character?

Ho (1986); House 1 (1986); Fletch (1985); No Small Affair (1984); and
Sometime (1982). Moreover, John Ratzenberger, in addition to his role as Cliff
Clavin, has appeared in the films: That Dam Cat (1997); Star Wars Triology
Special Edition (1997); One Night Stand (1997); The Empire Strikes Back Special Edition (1997); The Legend of the North Wind (1996); Toy Story
(1995); Bill Nye the Science Guy: Dinosaurs - Those Big Boneheads (1994);
How I Spent My Summer (1990); She's Having a Baby (1988); Going to the
Chapel (1988); House 2 - The Second Story (1987); Timestalkers (1987);
Combat Academy (1986); Warlords of the 21st Century (1982): Sometime
(1982); The Bitch (1979); Arabian Adventure (1979); and Star Wars (1977).
124 McFarland,14 F.3d at 923.
125 See supra note 90.
126 McFarlandmay have had a different result if the court decided this issue
in the 1930s or 1940s, when McFarland played the character of "Spanky," and
portrayed other characters as well.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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Secondly, McFarlandis unique because the character at issue is
an American classic, who has retained his wide-spread recognition
throughout the generations, nearly seventy years since the
inception of the "Spanky" character. However, such wide-spread
recognition is unlikely to occur in this era as technology and
inventions are leading the younger generations into unexplored
processes and ideas, inevitably resulting in less emphasis on the
classical representations of "the old days."
Therefore, the
McFarlandanalysis leaves the question of whether the actor must
acquire some sort of perpetual identity with his or her character in
order to meet the "associative value" test.
Furthermore, the McFarland decision does not answer the
question of whether, when applying the "associative value" test,
the public's perception should be taken as the public at large, or
whether such a determination should focus on the relevant
audience who had been exposed to the character. It seems that
cases such as McFarland and White base their opinions on the
general public's perception of the characters." 7 However, in Allen,
the court held the defendant appropriated the plaintiffs image,
even though the defendant's appropriation of Allen's earlier
character would not elicit recognition by those acquainted solely
with Allen's post-Annie Hall appearance." 8 Accordingly, the court
127 See McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920, where the court generally refers to an
actor's "public image" and the issue of whether "people" link the person with
the character; see also White, 971 F.2d at 1399, where the court does not limit
the analysis to a certain section of the population in its explanation, "The more
popular the celebrity, the greater the number of people who recognize her, and
the greater the visibility for the product." Id. The dissent also notes that the
majority's decision is based on the perception of the general "public." White,
989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
128 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624. The court notes:
[T]he hair style and expression, while characteristic of the endearing
"schlemiel" embodied by plaintiff in his earlier comic works, are out of
step with plaintiff's post-"Annie Hall" appearance and the serious
image and somber mien that he has projected in recent years. While
this distinction would be of no moment if defendants had appropriated
an actual photograph of plaintiff from 15 years ago such as those
submitted by plaintiff for comparison, it is relevant to the question of
whether the audience of movie watchers at whom this advertisement
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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relied on evidence that the target audience of the advertisement
associated the character with the actor.129
Additionally, McFarlandis not instructive as to what method the
court used to determine that public's perceptions and associations.
In Rogers and Wendt, the plaintiffs used survey evidence to
demonstrate whether the public associated the celebrities with the
defendants' use of their personas. Rogers' survey targeted the
public at large, 131 while Wendt surveyed only those who may be
exposed to the defendant's appropriation.13 ' Nonetheless, these
techniques were used only to provide evidence of the misleading
nature of the defendants' advertisements, not to demonstrate
whether the public identified the actor with his or her character.
B. What Aspects of the Characterare Protected
Once it is determined which characters should be protected via
the right of publicity, the next step is to identify which aspects of
the character are shielded by this protection. It has been noted the
'right of publicity is no longer limited to "the name or likeness of
an individual, but now extends to a person's nickname, signature,
physical
pose,
characterizations,
singing
style,
vocal
characteristics, body parts, frequently used phrases, car,
performance style, mannerisms, and gestures, provided that these
are distinctive and publicly identified with the person claiming the
right." ' The White court acknowledged the expansive scope of
right of publicity protection by holding "the common law right of
publicity reaches means of appropriation other than name or
likeness, [and]... the specific means of appropriation are relevant
only for determining whether the defendant has in fact
appropriated the plaintiff's identify.""'33 The court explained: "[tihe
was aimed would conclude thatplaintiff had actually appeared in the
1984 advertisement. Id.
SeeNegri v.Schering Corp., 333 F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y.1971).
129 Id.
130 See supra note 62.
131 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 814. The actors offered data obtained by a consumer
survey into evidence which was "taken inthe vicinity of the Cheers bars at the
Cleveland and Kansas City airports." Id.
132 Coombe, supra note 13, at 367.
133 White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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right of publicity does not require that appropriations of identity be
accomplished through particular means to be actionable."' 34 Thus,
the court held the defendant's robot appropriated Vanna White's
identity despite the fact that the robot did not physically resemble
Ms. White. 13' Rather, the defendant appropriated her identity by
displaying the robot in surroundings that evoked the identity of
136
White in the public's mind.
Similarly, the Carson court held that the phrase "Here's
Johnny" sufficiently identified the plaintiff, explaining a right of
publicity violation is not dependent on whether the actor's name or
likeness was used, but rather, whether the actor's identity was
exploited.'37 The Carson ruling has additional significance, in that
the phrase "Here's Johnny" was not coined by Carson but rather by
his co-host, Ed McMahon, when announcing Carson's character on
The Tonight Show. Hence, combining the Carson opinion with the
test set forth in McFarland, it seems if a phrase or nickname
becomes associated with a character, and the character is so

134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. The court reasoned:
The female-shaped robot is wearing a long gown, blond wig, and large
jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at times, but so do
many other women. The robot is in the process of turning a block
letter on a game-board. Vanna White dresses like this while turning
letters on a game-board but perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing
women do this as well. The robot is standing on what looks to be the
Wheel of Fortune game show set. Vanna White dresses like this, turns
letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. She is the
only one. Id.
137 Carson, 698 F.2d at 835. The Sixth Circuit in its reversal of the district
court's opinion held:
The right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest
of celebrities in their identities. The theory of the right is that a
celebrity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and
the celebrity has an interest that may be protected form the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity . . . If the
celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there was been an
invasion of his right whether or not his "name or likeness" is used.
Carson's identity may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson,
or his picture is not used. Id.
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inextricably identified with the actor that the actor's own identity
would be evoked by the nickname, the actor's right of publicity
may be violated by misappropriation of the phrase or nickname. 38
Not all courts are accepting of the right of publicity's expansive
scope of protection. As earlier noted, the Wendt court noted the
right of publicity "protects more than the knowing use of a
plaintiffs name or likeness for commercial purposes, ' 139 yet
remanded the case for a determination of "the degree to which the
figures look like [the actors]." 4 ° Therefore, the Wendt decision
seems opposed to the expanding coverage of the right of publicity
by limiting its analysis solely to the determination of the degree of
physical similarity.
C. How Much of the CharacterMust a Defendant Take
This section examines the issues of what must be appropriated to
subject a defendant to a claim for violating an individual's right of
publicity. Courts continue to vary their assessments of this issue
by finding violations of the right of publicity in a variety of
circumstances, ranging from exact copying to reminding the public
of the celebrity through the representation." Some courts have
extended the definition of actionable uses by the defendant by
finding appropriation of the celebrity's identity in situations where
138 Cases which have addressed a celebrities' right of publicity in their
personas, rather than in their characters have upheld this rationale. See, e.g.
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 90 Wis.2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979)
(holding that the defendant's use of the name "Crazylegs" on its shaving gel for
women violated Elroy Hirsch's right of publicity, as he was known by that
nickname); Ali v. Playgirl,Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
a nude sketch of a black man in a boxing ring entitled "Mystery Man" violated
Muhammad Ali's right of publicity, in that the advertisement contained
language referring to the figure as "The Greatest," and Ali commonly referred to
himself by that phrase.) Additionally, Prosser has explained that "a stage or
other fictitious name can be so identified with the plaintiff that he is entitled to
protection against its use." Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 404 (1960).
Prosser also pointed out that "[i]f a fictitious name is used in a context which
tends to indicate that the name is that of the plaintiff, the factual case for identity
is strengthened." Prosser, at 403.
139 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811.
140 Id.
141 See infra notes 143 through 155 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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the commercial use was arguably not to suggest the celebrity's
endorsement of the product. 42
McFarland involved exact copying of both the name and
likeness of the plaintiff.4 3 The defendant entitled his restaurant
"Spanky McFarland's" and decorated the interior of the
establishment with pictures and murals of the plaintiff in his
portrayal of the character, Spanky McFarland.'"
Thus, the
defendant took both the plaintiffs name and likeness, the two
attributes that the right of publicity was originally deemed to
protect. 4 ' Additionally, the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
identity indicated the plaintiff either endorsed or owned the
establishment, as the entire theme of the restaurant centered on the
plaintiffs character and the television series which featured the
6
4

role.1

In Wendt, the defendants developed a bar depicting the
atmosphere associated with the Cheers television show, on which
the plaintiffs played characters that were also displayed within the
defendant's establishment. 47 Although the bar was designed to
resemble the bar in Cheers, the figures which resembled the
plaintiffs' characters of Norm and Cliff were not exact replicas of
the characters and not akin to the photographs or murals displayed
by the defendants in McFarland.'4' The court held that a violation
of the right of publicity does not require the use of the name or
exact likeness of the celebrity to present a potential cause of
142 The White decision was criticized, both by the dissenting opinion and
academics, as an unprecedented expansion of the right of publicity, claiming
that the advertisement did not suggest sponsorship and the opinion extended the
scope of the doctrine to simply reminding the public of a celebrity. See White,
989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); John R. Braatz, White v. Samsung
ElectronicsAmerica: The Ninth Circuit Turns a New Letter in CaliforniaRight
of Publicity Law, 15 Pace L. Rev. 161, 195-222 (1994).
143 McFarland,14 F.3d at 915.
144 Id. at 915-916.
145 Haelan Laboratories,Inc., 202 F.2d 866. Courts originally extended
right of publicity protection only to appropriations of a celebrity's name and
likeness.
146 Id.
147 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809.
148 Id.
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action. 149 The court required a determination that the robots
physically resembled the actors, but did not require an exact
replication of the plaintiffs' physical images in order to evoke an
actionable claim. 5 ' However, the court held that the "comparison
must be decided without reference to the context in which the
image appears;"'' consequently limiting the analysis to the
characters themselves, without reference to the bar's design.' 52
Therefore, the Wendt court, by looking solely to the robots without
requiring associated surroundings, appeared to require less of a
taking by the defendant than the McFarlanddecision.
The defendants in White arguably took very little of the
celebrity's image, but only appropriated the location with which
the plaintiff was associated.'53 Neither the robot nor its dress or
accessories clearly resembled the plaintiff; nonetheless, the robot's
placement in a location associated with Vanna White was
sufficient to violate White's right of publicity. 54 In this situation,
the defendant took very little from the celebrity's image, yet the
court viewed an appropriation of her typical surroundings as use of
the celebrity's persona.'55 Moreover, the defendant's use of Vanna
White's persona arguably did not suggest her endorsement of their
product, as the defendant produced a series of similar
advertisements, all of which played on events which are common

149 Id.
150 Id. at 809-810.
151 Id. at 809.
152 Id.
153 White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
154 Id.
155 White, 989 F.2d at 1514. The dissent views the majority's opinion as
creating a new tort for reminding the public of a celebrity. "Not to use a
celebrity's name, voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity
endorses the product; but simply to evoke the celebrity's image in the public's
mind." Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The dissent continues to explain that
now, "[i]nstead of having an exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or
voice, every famous person now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds
the public of her. After all, that's all Samsung did: It used an inanimate object
to remind people of White..." Id. at 1515.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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in the 1990's and portrayed them in a humorous manner without
explicitly stating sponsorship.' 56
Hence, it is obvious that courts' determinations of when a
character may receive right of publicity protection, which aspects
of the character are protected, and how much a defendant is
required to take in order to claim a violation of the right of
publicity varies significantly in case to case. Since the right of
publicity is a state-based law that may be either common law or
statutorily based, it is obvious that states' treatment of these causes
of action will differ. However, if the right of publicity is to
function both to preserve the celebrity's reputation and to deter
would-be infingers from appropriating the celebrity's identity, it is
essential that the doctrine is applied with uniformity, at the very
least, in the determination of what interests are protected under the
right. The third and final part of this Case Note will set forth a
proposal whereby courts must recognize the right of public's
protection as encompassing an actor's portrayal of a character in
certain situations. This final section will also recommend a test to
determine which characters may receive this protection, and
additionally, will list factors to aid in such an analysis.
PART III. A PROPOSED TEST TO DETERMINE WHEN AND
WHAT TYPE OF PROTECTION SHOULD BE AFFORDED
CHARACTERS UNDER THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Nearly every state recognizes the right of publicity, as either a
common law or statutory claim.'
Since each state's cause of
156 The dissent argues that Samsung's use of White's persona constituted a
parody and did not imply White's endorsement of the product. Id. at 15171520. See also Braatz, supra note 76; Steven R. Barnett, First Amendment
Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. 635 (1995). Both authors
support the dissent's view that Samsung's use constituted a parody which is
protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, Barnett notes that the decision
has caused a chilling effect among the advertising community, who lack the
resources and interest in asserting their free speech rights and attempting to
shape the law to protect those rights.
157 See Madow, supra note 13, at FN 23. In only two states, Nebraska and
New York, courts have rejected the common law right of publicity. However,
New York's privacy statute provides for some aspects of the right of publicity.

See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First
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action under the doctrine contains different elements and theories,
the courts' evaluations of such claims are not uniform as each court
must adhere to its state laws and precedent. These contrasting
analyses impede the goal of the doctrine, which is to prevent
unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person's identity.'58
This disparity in states' right of publicity laws results in a lack of
uniform protection of individuals from appropriation of their
identities; insufficient notice as to what constitutes infringing
behavior; and allows infringers to "shop" for a state with less
protective right of publicity laws. It is neither practical nor
probable that states will unify their statues and approaches to these
state based claims; therefore, this proposition is contingent upon
the enactment of a federal right of publicity statute. While the
elements and factors set forth in this proposal could serve as a
basis by which courts may assess state law claims, this approach
cannot effectively provide characters with right of publicity
protection without implementation of a federal statute to produce
state uniformity.
This proposed test encompasses each of the issues addressed in
the previous section by viewing the degree of protection to be
afforded a character pursuant to a sliding scale approach. The
sliding scale is representative of the spectrum set forth in Part I of
this Case Note, with characters belonging in the first tier of the
spectrum protected by the right of publicity absent the requirement
of a high associative value between the actor and the character, and
continuing to the final tier, which necessitates a showing of a high
associative value in order to receive protection. The test also
proposes that commercial use of any aspect of the character which
identifies the celebrity is actionable and the degree to which a
defendant must use these aspects should be assessed on a case by
case determination. However, before setting forth the elements of
the test, it is necessary to address the preemption issue which has

Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47, FN 26
(1994).
158 Haelan Laboratories,Inc., 202 F.2d at 870.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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been raised in the cases of Fleet v. CBS, Inc. 15 9 and Baltimore
6
Orioles v. Major League BaseballPlayers. 1
A. The Right ofPublicity in a Characteris not Preempted by the
FederalCopyrightAct
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides
a state statute is subject to preemption if it "'actually conflicts with
a valid federal statute' or 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.'""" Relying on the Constitution and §106 of the
Federal Copyright Act, Fleet, California's controlling authority,
has held that right of publicity claims brought under California's
statute are preempted by the Federal Copyright Law when the
claim involves a copyrighted work. 62
In Fleet, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
holding that right of publicity claims for appropriation of an actor'
performance violated the Copyright Act's prohibition of states
from legislating in the area of copyright law, in that "once [an
actor's] performances [are] put on film, they [become] 'dramatic
work[s]' 'fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression' that could be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated' through 'the
aid of a machine or device."" 63 The appellants, the parents of a
young actor, entered an agreement conveying to CBS the copyright
to the motion picture, White Dragon, including the theme, title and
159 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (1996).
160 805 F.2d 663, 677 (7th Cir. 1986).

161 Fleet, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1918, quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982).
162 Id. at 1924. §301 of the Federal Copyright Act provides: "On and after
January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to nay such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State." 17 U.S.C. §301 (1976).
163 Id.
at 1919, quoting 17 U.S.C. §102(a).
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characters of the motion picture.' After a controversy regarding
the salaries owed to the actors, the appellants informed CBS that
since they did not receive compensation for their work, CBS was
forbidden from using their "names, pictures, or likenesses in
conjunction with any exploitation of the film." 16 Nonetheless,
CBS released the film on videotape and allegedly included a
picture of Stephan Fleet on the box. 66
Rather than looking at the contractual language and addressing
the case as a contract dispute, the court broadly held "[b]ecause a
performance is fixed in a tangible form when it is recorded, a right
of publicity in [such] performance ... is subject to preemption." '67
The plaintiffs' claim involved the reproduction and distribution of
copyrighted performances; therefore, Fleet held the plaintiffs
claimed a right equivalent to the exclusive rights provided in §106
of the Federal Copyright Act. 168 The court based its decision in
part on the Seventh Circuit's similar decision of Baltimore Orioles,
as well as several district court decisions, 169 which held that right of
publicity claims are preempted in copyrighted performances. 7
164 Id. at 1914. The terms of the distribution agreement were, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The "Licensor hereby grants to Distributor [CBS Productions] the
exclusive right and License for the 'Distribution Term' ... to exercise
all rights of distribution in all media (including, without limitation,
theatrical, non-theatrical, free television, pay television, cable
television, and videocassette exhibition) with respect to the Picture
throughout the 'Territory' ... in and to that certain theatrical motion
picture entitled White Dragon ... including all contents thereof, all
present and future adaptations, versions and translations thereof and the
theme, title and characters thereof, and in and to all copyrights thereon
and renewals and extensions of copyright therein." Id. at FN 1.
165 Id. at 1914.
166 Id. at 1914-1915.
167 Id. at 1924, quoting Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball
Players, 805 F.2d at 677.
168 Id. at 1918-1919.
169 Fleet 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1923. The Fleet court referred to the cases of
Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C.
1992)(James Brown's right of publicity claim for displaying a clip of his
performance of the song "Please, Please, Please" in a 1991 movie was
preempted because the performance was copyrighted.); Rooney v. Columbia
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4

36

Cook: Should Right of Publicity Protection be Extended to Actors in the

1999]

RIGHT OFPUBLICITYPROTECTION

Although Fleet and its predecessors assert that right of publicity
claims are preempted in copyrighted works, the situations in which
these cases find preemption are in situations where the actual
performances have been appropriated.171 These cases do not
address instances where the character itself is taken from the actual
performance and appropriated in a different medium of expression,
such as the situation in Wendt. In discussing this issue, the Wendt
court held that Fleet is controlling authority only in the situation
where "the only claimed exploitation occurred through the
distribution of the actor's performance in a copyrighted movie.""17
Therefore, the court found the actors' claims were not preempted
by federal copyright law as they did not relate to the appropriation
of the original works in which the actors appeared.173 Additionally,
the court found the plaintiffs asserted rights not protected by
federal law. 74
Therefore, the holdings of Fleet and Baltimore Orioles do not
suggest that the examples cited throughout this Case Note, where
the character is appropriated in a medium other than the original
Pictures Industries, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(Actor Mickey
Rooney's right of publicity claims were waived by granting defendants the
copyrights to his pre-1960 films.); Muller v. Walt Disney Productions, 871 F.
Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(The conductor in Walt Disney's Fantasia gave up
all rights by granting Disney the right to control the distribution, exploitation,
and exhibition of the film.).
170 Id. at 677. The court held that the Baltimore Orioles baseball players
could not assert a right of publicity in their performances because the baseball
games are copyrightable, thus preempting a cause of action under the right of
publicity. The court held that "[b]y virtue of being videotaped ...the players'
performances are fixed in tangible form, and any rights of publicity in their
performances that are equivalent to the rights contained in the copyright of the
telecast are preempted." Id. at 675.
171 See supra notes 161 through 170 and accompanying text.
172 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810.
173 Id.
174 Id. The court explains that "'claims are not preempted by the federal
copyright statute so long as they contain elements, such as the invasion of
personal rights ...that are different in kind from copyright infringement."' Id.
(quoting Wendt v. Host, 1995 WL 115571 at *1 (9th Cir. 1995)) (quoting Waits
v. Frito-Lay,Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976)).
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work, pose a preemption problem.
However, consider the
hypothetical where the character of Elaine Benes from Seinfeld,
played by Julia Louis-Dreyfus, is appropriated by using a clip of
the series where Elaine searches all of New York City to find Mr.
Pitt the perfect pair of socks. Obviously, Castle Rock could sue for
copyright infringement; however, pursuant to Fleet and Baltimore
Orioles, Louis-Dreyfus has no means by which to seek redress for
appropriation of her character since the exploitation occurred
through use of a copyrighted work. This distinction seems quite
arbitrary as the unauthorized use of the Elaine character in a
copyrighted work is no less identifying of Louis-Dreyfus than the
use of Elaine in a different medium. In fact, actual copying should
present an even stronger case for celebrity exploitation as the
appropriation is an exact replica of the character and consequently,
the individual. Moreover, claims under the right of publicity
doctrine contain elements beyond the scope of protection provided
by the Federal Copyright Act. Nonetheless, Fleet and Baltimore
Orioles present obstacles to persons seeking redress for
appropriations of their characters in original works while in both
California and the Seventh Circuit. Hopefully, these decisions will
be reversed in the near future but, until that time, the following
proposal is limited to appropriations of characters outside of their
original works in disputes arising these jurisdictions. 75

175 Shortly before this Case Note went to press, the Central District of
California's decision of Hoffman v. CapitalCities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867
(1999) came out. In this decision, the district court held that right of publicity
claims for appropriation of an actor's image appearing in a copyrighted work
were not preempted by the Federal Copyright Act because the right to protect
the use of one's own name an image is separate from the copyright interest of
the copyright holder. Thus, the decision completely opposed the opinions stated
in Fleet, although the court did not even mention the Fleet decision. The court
held that the defendant, Los Angeles Magazine, violated Dustin Hoffman's right
of publicity, as well as federal and state unfair competition claims, by publishing
a still frame from the motion picture Tootsie whereby Hoffman was clad in a
gown and shoes advertised by the magazine. Therefore, the decision further
supports the views advanced in this Case Note by providing right of publicity
protection for misappropriation of Hoffman's character.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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After addressing this preliminary matter, the remainder of Part
MI will set forth a proposed test for extending the protection
afforded by the right of publicity to characters.
B. The Sliding Scale Test for Determiningwhich
CharactersReceiveProtection Under the Right of Publicity
Right of publicity protection should be extended to any character
that is "so associated with [the actor] that [the character] becomes
'
inseparable from the actor's own public image."176
However, the
"associative value" test, as set forth in McFarland, should be
applied as a sliding scale which, pursuant to the spectrum set forth
in Part I, provides protection to a character at the top tier of the
spectrum without requiring a showing of association and requires a
high association level for characters in the bottom tier. The
purpose for the progressive level of proof of association rests in the
acknowledgement that celebrities in the first tier of the spectrum
(i.e., talk show hosts), are implicitly associated with their
characters as they convey their personality into their screen
personification. Conversely, an actor who portrays a character in a
bottom tier of the spectrum (i.e., an actor who portrays a character
unique from the actor personally) must establish that he or she has
imparted some level of creativity or originality in the character in
order to elicit public recognition of the actor upon exploitation of
the character.
Celebrities can prove their associative value with their character
by utilizing the fact finding techniques which demonstrate
consumer confusion in both right of publicity and trademark
Such evidence includes surveys, 1 77
infringement analyses.
176 McFarland,14 F.3d at 920.
177 Although survey evidence has been attacked as providing unreliable
evidence through poor questions (See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Allstate
Driving School, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) and methodology (See,
e.g., Carter-Wallace,Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F/2d 794 (9th Cir.
1970). Nonetheless, survey evidence can explain what the public is thinking at
the time of litigation. Therefore, surveys are usually admissible as indicators of
the public's opinion, provided that:
". .. (1) the 'universe' was properly defined, (2) a representative
sample of that universe was selected, (3) the questions to be asked of
interviewees were framed in a clear, concise and nonleading manner,
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statistical data,'78 individual accounts' 79 and expert testimony. 80
Moreover, much like courts' analyses of §43(a) of the Lanham Act
claims, 8 ' the 'universe' of such data should only encompass the
relevant audience, rather than drawing samples from the public at
large. The evidence should demonstrate that, like McFarland,the
actor has acquired a general identification with his or her character
throughout the public; however, a finding of widespread notoriety
can exist in situations where the character is not an American
Classic, as was Spanky McFarland. Additionally, evidence of
character merchandising that exploits the image of the actor
supports a finding that the actor is associated with the character. 8 '
(4) sound interview procedures were followed by competent
interviewers who had no knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for
which the survey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately
reported, (6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted
statistical principles and (7) objectivity of the entire process was
assured."
Schieffelin & Co. v. The Jack Company of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
178 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), where plaintiff presented evidence that 30% of
the population surveyed associated defendant's name, McDental, with plaintiff's
family of marks. Id. at 1130.
179 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1986), where the court assessed both statistical evidence as well as individual
accounts to determine that the appellant's back pocket stitching on its jeans
caused consumer confusion. Id. at 869-870.
180 See, e.g., ComputerAssocs. Int., Inc. v. Altal, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). Expert testimony may
be relied on if needed to aid in the analysis. However, courts are hesitant to
allow such testimony, as factual issues (such as the issue of copyright
infringement in these cases) should ultimately be determined by the trier of fact.
181 See, e.g., Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d
729 (2d Cir. 1991). The relevant inquiry in a consumer confusion inquiry is the
determination of whether the potential consumers will be confused by the
defendant's use of the mark. Id. at 733. In Beam, the court held that evidence
of consumer confusion within the public at large was insufficient to demonstrate
actual confusion as "consumers of alcoholic beverages [possessed] a high
awareness of the mark.. ." Id.

182 This was the situation in Lugosi, where Bela Lugosi's heirs brought suit
for appropriation of the actor's image in merchandising of the Count Dracula
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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Finally, the court must determine on a case by case basis whether,
in the situation where the actor becomes highly associated with
another character after already establishing a proprietary interest in
a previously portrayed character, the public at large continues to
associate the actor with the original character.
C. The Elements Which are PortrayedMust be Viewed as a
Whole to Determine Whether They Identifjy the Character
In light of the expanding protection provided individuals for
exploitation of their personas, the right of publicity as applied to
characters should also embody this expansive view, thus
concentrating not on how the celebrity's identity was appropriated,
"but whether the defendant has done so.' ' 183 A character is
comprised of a "name, physical appearance, attributes,
mannerisms, speech and expression, habits, attire, setting, and
locale.', 4 Therefore, the court must determine which of the
character's attributes are the most distinctive, consequently
18
identifying the celebrity when used by the defendant. 1
character, in that the merchandise was in the likeness of Bela Lugosi as Count
Dracula. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 817.
183 This is the approach set forth in White, 971 F.2d at 1398. The court
explains the approach as follows:
Indeed, if we treated the means of appropriation as dispositive in our
analysis of the right of publicity, we would not only weaken the right
but effectively eviscerate it. The right would fail to protect those
plaintiffs most in need of its protection. Advertisers use celebrities to
promote their products. The more popular the celebrity, the greater the
number of people who recognize her, and the greater visibility for the
product. The identities of the most popularcelebrities are not only the
most attractivefor advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without
resortingto obvious means such as name, likeness or voice. Id.at 1399
(emphasis added).
184 Niro, supra note 3, at 360.
185 The White court, in its adoption of this test, explained the following
hypothetical to illustrate its application:
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a mechanical
robot with male features, an African-American complexion, and a bald
head. The robot is wearing black hightop Air Jordan basketball
sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts,
and the number 23 (though not revealing "Bulls" or "Jordan" lettering).
The ad depicts the robot dunking a basketball one-handed, stiff-armed,
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Although many scholars dispute the White holding,'86 critics of
the decision did not claim that the advertisement failed to elicit
public recognition of Vanna White. Rather, a common argument
set forth is a defendant should not be prohibited from simply
"reminding" the public of a celebrity.'87 However, the right of
publicity's expansion beyond appropriations of an individual's
name and likeness is premised on the acknowledgment that traits
other than a name or likeness may identify, or remind, the public of
a celebrity.'88 Consequently, a defendant's display of a location
that is associated with a character, while not "belonging" to the
actor, may in fact appropriate his or her image.
D. Infringing Uses Must Be Determinedon a Case By Case
Basis
As discussed in Part II, courts have protected celebrity identities
from misappropriation in a variety of contexts and uses by
defendants, each case depending upon a factual determination of
whether the defendant's action evoked recognition of the
celebrity's identity. This test proposes that the defendant's
activities should be viewed as a whole, and courts should not limit
their analyses to looking at one factor of the appropriation in
isolation.'89 Beyond this, violations of the right of publicity must
be found on a case by case basis, as "[a] rule which says that the
right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine
legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging out. Now
envision that this ad is run on television during professional basketball
games. Considered individually, the robot's physical attributes, its
dress, and its stance tell us little. Taken together, they lead to the only
conclusion that nay sports viewer who has registered a discernible
pulse in the past five years would reach: the ad is about Michael
Jordan.
White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
186 See Barnett and Braatz, supra notes 142 and 156, respectively.
187 See supra note 155.
188 Midler v. FordMotor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). This court held
that the right of publicity protects the identity of the celebrity, rather than a mere
"laundry list" of particular means of appropriation. Id. at 463-464.
189 This approach conflicts from that taken in Wendt. See supra note 151
through 152 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss2/4
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different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the
clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth."19
CONCLUSION

Americans place great value on both individual achievement and
the right to receive compensation for those achievements. 9
Additionally, Americans revere fame and those who achieve such
status. 9 ' The right of publicity provides protection of these values
by preventing the unauthorized commercial exploitation of
celebrity personas. Therefore, these values which underlie the
doctrine's protection are furthered by the recognition that an
individual possesses many attributes, and dependent upon the
distinctiveness of these characteristics, exploitation of a single
element of an individual's persona may elicit recognition of his or
her identity.
This Case Note recognizes the existence of this phenomenon,
and acknowledges in certain situations a celebrity's identity may
be exploited by an appropriation of an entity which the celebrity
does not own, such as a character which the actor has portrayed. It
is contrary to the goals of the right of publicity to withhold
protection from such individuals merely because of lack of
ownership in the exploited entity. Indeed, such a denial or
protection would serve as a disincentive for actors to develop their
characters in such a distinctive way as to create an association of
the character with the actor. Like copyright and patent law, the
right of publicity serves to protect these "performances, inventions
and endeavors [which] enrich our society.'"93 Therefore, it is
essential to the function of the doctrine, to provide protection from
all unauthorized appropriations of an individual's identity.
Angela D. Cook

190 White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
191 Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 203, 216
(1954).
192 See Kwall, supra note 14.
193 Lugosi, 25 Cal.3d at 840 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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